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COMMENTARY
What Now For The Insanity Defense?
Fernand N. Dutile *
Thomas H Singer**
The jury's verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity in the case
of President Reagan's attempted assassination has stirred vivid de-
bate, both in and out of the U.S. Congress and other public bodies.
This article1 will briefly discuss the history of the insanity defense in
the United States, the current status of that defense, and some major
problems remaining in its use.
First, what we mean by "the insanity defense" must be made
clear, since there are many points at which a defendant's mental con-
dition becomes relevant. We might ask about a person's mental situ-
ation in connection with the voluntariness of his confession, the
voluntariness of his consent to a search, his ability to make a valid
waiver of his right to counsel or appeal, or any of the many other
rights associated with a criminal prosecution. Moreover, we might
consider a convicted criminal's mental condition even in connection
with an execution, it being commonly thought that one should not
be executed while insane.2 A defendant's mental situation is relevant
as well in the determination of his competence to stand trial, an in-
quiry which focuses on whether he can understand the nature of the
proceedings against him and can effectively assist counsel in main-
taining a defense.3 Perhaps contrary to popular opinion, the issue of
competence to stand trial presents the most common occasion for the
assessment of the defendant's mental status. This aspect of mental
impairment arises much more frequently than does the actual in-
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B., 1962, Assumption College, J.D.,
1965, Notre Dame Law School.
** Partner in the South Bend, Indiana, law firm of Lysohir & Singer and Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law at Notre Dame Law School. A.B., 1956, L.L.B., 1959, University of Michigan.
1 This article is based on a paper read to a combined meeting of the St. Joseph County,
Indiana, Bar and Medical Associations.
2 See Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9
(1950). See generally S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PRocEssEs 823-24 (4th ed. 1983).
3 See, e.g., People v. Burson, 11 111. 2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957).
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sanity defense. 4
The insanity defense differs from other inquiries into a defend-
ant's mental condition. The insanity defense explores the responsi-
bility of the defendant at the time of the alleged crime. The inquiry,
then, relates to one of the most fundamental questions addressed by
the criminal trial-whether this person is to be blamed for what he
did. Precisely because a verdict is a legal-moral judgment and not a
purely medical one, the issue is put not to a panel of experts on
mental illness, but rather to a jury. After all, a defendant may
clearly have been suffering from a mental illness at the time of the
alleged criminal conduct, and yet not be found legally insane.
In the United States, four different standards for assessing legal
insanity have achieved prominence. The first of these, imported
from England and dating from an 1843 opinion of the House of
Lords, grew out of the attempted assassination of Sir Robert Peel, the
Prime Minister of England. As a result of mistaken identity, Edward
Drummond, Peel's private secretary, was killed. The accused,
M'Naghten, was acquitted. Public indignation at this acquittal, led
by the Queen herself, culminated in the Judges of England being
summoned to the House of Lords to answer questions concerning the
insanity defense.5 Their answers, in the form of an advisory opinion
now known as the M'Naghten Rules,6 stated that a defendant is le-
gally irresponsible if he either does not know the nature and quality
of his conduct or does not know that it is wrong. This essentially
cognitive test was imported into the United States and was often
7
supplemented by a second, so-called "irresistible impulse," test.8 The
irresistible impulse, although largely self-explanatory, presents a seri-
ous question concerning one's ability to establish whether an impulse
was in fact irresistible.
9
The third major insanity standard to achieve prominence in the
4 See Morris, The Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 477, 480
(1982). See also J. VORENBERG, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS
163 (2d ed. 1981).
It is estimated that in New York the insanity defense is involved in fewer than 1.5 per-
cent of felony cases, and, in 75 percent of those, fails. Kaufman, The Insanity Plea on Trial,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, (Magazine) at 16, col. 3.
5 For a fuller account of the AWaghten context, see F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON & A.
MOENSSENS, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL LAW 685-86 (2d ed. 1979).
6 See Daniel M'Naghten's Case, House of Lords, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
7 See J. VORENBERG, supra note 4, at 162.
8 See P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 658
(1982).
9 See id. at 693-97; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 972-73 (3d ed. 1982).
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United States was the Durham rule, 10 announced by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1954. Although the in-
sanity defense is commonly associated with homicide cises,; Monte
Durham was charged with housebreaking. The rule emanating from
his case stated that a defendant was not legally responsible if his act
was the "product" of a mental disease or defect. The court felt that
its new rule was needed because the M'Naghten "right-wrong" stan-
dard was erroneously premised on a conception of the human being
as guided purely by intellect. To the contrary, the court asserted,
"The science of psychiatry now recognizes that a man is an inte-
grated personality, and that reason, which is only one element in
that personality, is not the sole determinant of his- conduct."' 1 Nor
did the addition of the "irresistible impulse" standard cure the defect
since, the court explained, it "carries the misleading implication that
'diseased mental condition[s]' produce only sudden, momentary or
spontaneous inclinations to commit unlawful acts."' 2 Although the
Durham rule caused enormous discussion in legal journals and else-
where, the court acknowledged that the rule was "not unlike that
followed by the New Hampshire court since 1870."'13 The Durham
rule, however, never gained general acceptance, surely to the great
disappointment of Judge David Bazelon, its author and perhaps the
jurist who has devoted the most attention to the problem of mental
illness and the criminal law. Indeed, there was substantial litigation
in the District of Columbia Circuit itself to determine how the rule
was to be applied.
14
Ultimately, even the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit abandoned the Durham test 15 in favor of a fourth test, the
American Law Institute-Model Penal Code standard. This stan-
dard states that a person is legally irresponsible if, "as a result of
mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to ap-
preciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law"' 6 at the time of the
charged conduct. Although superficially it seems merely to revive a
10 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
11 Id at 871.
12 Id at 873.
13 Id at 874 (citing State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870)).
14 See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967); McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 592 (D.C.
Cir. 1959); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
15 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
16 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Official Draft 1962).
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combination of the MAaghten and "irresistible impulse" tests, the
Model Penal Code test has several advantages. In recognizing the
concept of "substantial capacity," the test allows for a degreed assess-
mient,-notaniall-br-nothing conclusion. Moreover, the word "appre-
ciate," rather than "know," also allows for better calibration. After
all, one who knows that killing someone is criminal but thinks it no
worse than jaywalking probably does not appreciate the criminality
of his conduct.
Some jurisdictions which have accepted the Model Penal Code
test have rejected an accompanying paragraph1 7 designed to make
the insanity defense unavailable to psychopathic personalities or soci-
opaths.,8 The additional paragraph states that "[t]he terms 'mental
disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct."'19 Although the
Model Penal Code test has represented a clear-cut trend in recent
years, it has not been without its critics, especially in light of the
verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" returned by the jury
following the trial involving the attempted assassination of President
Reagan. Since that time, many hearings have been held and many
discussions conducted concerning the future of the insanity defense.
Both doctors and lawyers are involved in the current contro-
versy. The American Psychiatric Association, issuing its first compre-
hensive statement on the insanity defense, recently called for a
continuation of the defense in some form, but urged that it be limited
to cases of serious mental illness.20 The American Bar Association's
Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice
and its Commission on the Mentally Disabled jointly made dramatic
recommendations which were accepted by the ABA House of Dele-
gates at its February meeting.21 These groups urged "a defense of
non-responsibility for crime which focuses solely on whether the de-
fendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, was unable to appre-
17 Brawner, 471 F.2d at 993-94.
18 Id. at 993. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 comment (rent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
19 Brawner, 471 F.2d at 993; MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (Official Draft 1962).
20 See ABA Panels, Psychiatry Association Issue Reports on Insanity Defense, 32 CRIM. L. REP.
2365, 2366 (BNA) (Feb. 2, 1983). The National Commission on the Insanity Defense, estab-
lished by the National Mental Health Association, urged the continuation of the insanity
defense. Study says Defendants Should Prove Insanity, Sentinel (Winston-Salem, N.C.), Apr. 6,
1983, at 28, col. 1. To promote public understanding, however, the verdict itself should be
"not responsible by reason of insanity" rather than "not guilty by reason of insanity." Id. at
col. 3.
21 See ABA Hears Proposals for New Court, Acts on Insanity Defense, Ethics, 32 CRIM. L. REP.
2410, 2411-12 (BNA) (Feb. 16, 1983).
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ciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the time of the offense
charged."22 The major result of this standard, for jurisdictions with
the Model Penal Code test, is to eliminate that branch of the test
allowing a defense for those who are unable to conform their conduct
to the requirements of the law. The ABA panels argue that eliminat-
ing the volitional part of the test prevents "fabricated" expert testi-
mony concerning impairment of "normal" behavior controls. Such
testimony has made the Model Penal Code test vulnerable because of
the lack of scientific ability to measure either a defendant's capacity
for self-control or its impairment. The suggested test also does away
with the Model Penal Code's "overly vague 'substantial capacity'
language." 2
3
Perhaps all the furor over the wording of the defense is mis-
placed. The American Psychiatric Association has pointed out that
whether a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity depends less
on the particular standard employed than on "the [decision of the]
individual trial judges to permit or not permit psychiatric testimony
concerning the broad range of mental functioning of possible rele-
vance for a jury's deliberation," a matter not handily dealt with by
legislation.2 4 The APA, also unhappy with the Model Penal Code
standard, urged an insanity test which focuses on "severely abnormal
mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person's
perception or understanding of reality.)
2 5
An additional issue raised in connection with the insanity de-
fense is who should bear the burden of proof. Since legal sanity may
not technically be a legal element of the charged offense, 26 it is ap-
parently constitutional to put the burden of proving insanity on the
defendant,2 7 as the U.S. Supreme Court has itself recognized .2
Nonetheless, the ABA panels referred to earlier 29 urged jurisdictions
22 Seid. at 2365, 2411.
23 Id at 2366.
24 Id. at 2367.
25 Id
26 But see R. PERKINS & R. BoYcE, supra note 9, at 985 (stating that the prevailing view
is that insanity "negatives an element of the offense charged").
27 Compare Mullany v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (absense of provocation must be
proved by the prosecutor beyond a reasonable doubt since it is an implication of malice afore-
thought, an element of murder under Maine law) with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977) (the burden of proof with regard to extreme emotional distress may be placed on the
defendant since it does not negate any element of the charged crime). See also Dutile, The
Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Comment on the Mullaney-Patterson Doctrine, 55 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 380 (1980).
28 Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
29 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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using the test recommended by those panels not to place the burden
of proof on the defendant. In jurisdictions using the current Model
Pehal Code test, however, the panels urged that the defendant bear
the burden of proof to a preponderance of the evidence. 30
Whatever action legislatures take with regard to these matters,
31
four important concerns must guide them. First, we must retain, for
the foreseeable future, some criminal defense based on mental irre-
sponsibility.32 The insanity defense, in whatever form it takes, re-
flects the fact that our criminal law is based upon the concept of
blameworthiness. Judge Irving Kaufman of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit explains that, "Essentially, the law is concerned
with establishing fault; it focuses on individual responsibility as a
way of controlling behavior and articulating public morality.
'33
Any attempt to do away with a suitable insanity standard would sub-
stantially undermine the moral mandate of our system. Indeed, it
may be unconstitutional to eliminate the insanity defense.34 As
Judge Kaufman further noted, "[N]o criminal justice system that
finds a defendant guilty while ignoring his mental inability to control
his actions can be viewed as fair and just.
'35
Concepts like absolute liability, used in lower-level offenses,
have already diluted the judgmental character of our criminal law.
Elimination of the insanity defense, however, would render incredi-
ble any insistence that our system is based on the moral judgment of
30 32 CRIM. L. REP. at 2366. The National Commission on the Insanity Defense recently
recommended that the burden of proof be put on the defendant. See Sentinel, supra note 20,
at 28, col. 1.
31 Proposals, to some extent overlapping, have included the creation of panels of in-
dependent psychiatrists and psychologists, judicially appointed to testify as court experts,
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 19, col. 2, abolition of the special defense of insanity, a qualified
defense of diminished responsibility, see Morris, supra note 4, at 499, and restricting the rele-
vance of mental illness to the specific mens rea requirements of the crime charged or to the
sentencing procedure, see P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 8, at 759-61. Con-
gress, in response to the verdict in the case of President Reagan's attempted assassination, is
considering limiting the defense of insanity in federal crimes to persons who can prove they
were "unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of their acts." Winston-Salem Jour-
nal, July 24, 1983, at A6, col. 1.
32 For a strong argument to the contrary, see Morris, supra note 4, at 499-512. But see
Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 284 (1968). See generally S. KADISH,
S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, supra note 2, at 903-09.
33 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 17, col. 1.
34 See State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 634 (1929); Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142,
132 So. 581 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1920).
35 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 16, col. 4. Cf. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 163
(1964): "Yet if the view is accepted that man is incapable of responsible action, legal morality
becomes meaningless. Without this responsibility, we would no longer judge a man, we
would simply act upon him."
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our juries. Perhaps, due to the enormous influence on conduct pro-
vided by genetic and environmental factors, the entire system should
be replaced by one which focuses only on whether a person per-
formed an antisocial act and, if so, the best disposition for him. Until
that unlikely time, and as long as we insist that the criminal law take
a moral perspective, a defense based on legal irresponsibility must be
allowed.
Second, we must insist on a clear allocation of authority be-
tween medical experts and the jury. In the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, under the Durham rule, psychiatrists were often asked whether
the defendant's act was the product of a mental disease or defect-
the ultimate issue before the jury. 36 Although the expert must pro-
vide the medical data to inform the jury's legal-moral decision re-
garding the defendant's responsibility, the jury itself must answer the
ultimate legal question.
Third, any legislature must be especially careful before it yields,
as several states already have,37 to the seduction of a "guilty but men-
tally ill" verdict. 38 There are serious suggestions that such a verdict
merely provides a jury with the opportunity to compromise. 39 More-
over, it deludes the jury into thinking that the defendant will get
treatment which in fact is unavailable or is already available even to
those convicted of crime.4° In many jurisdictions, the difference be-
tween a "guilty but mentally ill" verdict and a "guilty" verdict is a
36 See Brawner, 471 F.2d at 978-79. But see Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
which allows the expert to give an opinion on the ultimate legal question. See also Suggs v. La
Vallee, 570 F.2d 1092, 1115, n.58 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978); United States v.
Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
37 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE 35-
36-2-5 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 768.36 (1982).
38 The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime recommended such a verdict for
federal law. Kaufman, supra note 4, at 19, col. 3.
39 The compromise results from the fact that the label contains both a blameworthiness
("guilty") component for jurors leaning toward guilt and a mental health component ("men-
tally ill") for jurors concerned about the defendant's mental impairment. Indeed, an individ-
ual juror, torn between the two concerns, may find the verdict attractive. "The danger is that
[the jury] may often choose the middle option as a form of compromise verdict rather than as
a carefully reasoned decision." Kaufman, supra note 4, at 19, col. 4. Judge Kaufman adds,
however, that Michigan's experience with the verdict has carried with it no appreciable
change in the number of "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdicts. Id.
40 The jury will quite naturally feel that since both "guilty" and "guilty but mentally ill"
are among the possible verdicts, the latter must be different and the difference must be in the
treatment of the defendant and the facilities in which he might be kept. In fact, both the
"guilty" and the "guilty but mentally ill" verdicts may subject the convicted to the very same
treatment and facilities. See Peters, 'Guilty But Mentally Ill' Verdict Still Controversial, Indianapo-
lis Star, Feb. 28, 1982, § 5, at 1, col. 1. See also 32 GRIM. L. REP. at 2366.
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formal one only.41 Indeed, the ABA panels called the "guilty but
mentally -ill" verdict- a "yes, but . . ." verdict, one based on "moral
sleight-of-hand. ' 42 . The American Psychiatric Association also rec-
ommended against such a defense, labeling it "an easy way out" for
the jury.43 The defense allows some who might otherwise have been
found not guilty by reason of insanity to be "siphoned off." In any
event, the APA's report continued, such a standard makes sense only
where meaningful mental health treatment exists for those found
"guilty but mentally ill." In these days of financial retrenchment,
legislative provision for such treatment is highly unlikely.
44
Fourth, we must scrutinize our post-trial procedures for those
institutionalized subsequent to a "not guilty by reason of insanity"
verdict. Here, too, the American Psychiatric Association Report may
be instructive. Suspicious of a release system based on periodic re-
view of "future dangerousness," the Report urges the law to recog-
nize both the importance of medication in controlling the conduct of
the mentally ill and the possibility that a patient may not necessarily
be cured or made non-dangerous. It recommends that release deci-
sions be made by a panel composed of both medical experts and
other criminal justice professionals, similar to Oregon's Psychiatric
Security Reform Board.
45
For centuries, philosophers, doctors, and lawyers have explored
and debated issues relating to the enormous complexity of the mind.
Accordingly, we cannot hope to settle these matters in any brief dis-
cussion. We must, however, resolve to deal with them in a calm,
enlightened, and rational manner, with a vigilant eye on our impor-
tant and traditional values. Otherwise, rushing to unwise legislation,
as the result of the verdict in a trial noteworthy primarily for the
official status of the intended victim, may itself become an irresistible
impulse.
41 See Peters, supra note 40. See also 32 CRIM. L. REP. at 2366; Kaufman, supra note 4, at
19, col. 4.
42 32 CRIM. L. REP. at 2366.
43 Id
44 Id
45 Id at 2367. See also Kaufman, supra note 4, at 20, col. 4.
[Vol. 58:1104]
